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Abstract
Central cities in metropolitan areas are attractive to both residents and busi-
nesses, but there is insufficient space to accommodate both. As a result, residential
and commercial properties compete for land. By examining the long-term impact of
a real estate bubble on the land-use pattern of Tokyo and Osaka from 1980 to 2017,
we find that fluctuations in land prices have influenced demand for commercial
land relative to residential land, which in turn has affected residential choices.
During the period of rising land prices, land developers favored commercial de-
velopment over residential purposes, which increased the daytime population in
central cities and at the same time reduced the residential population. However,
during the economic downturn, with the reduction in demand for commercial
space, houses were favored by land developers and there was a recentralization of
residents. The causal estimates show that the mechanism we propose can explain
approximately 40 percent of the population growth in central Tokyo and Osaka
after 1995. In addition, these land-use conversions led to changes in the housing
structure in terms of building height and house size. Our evidence provides a new
explanation for the recent changes in central neighborhoods observed in many
advanced economies.
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1 Introduction
The share of the central city population in the major metropolitan areas (MAs) of the
United States fell significantly in the second half of the 20th century. This situation has
been attributed to factors including the increases in car use and highway construction
(LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983; Baum-Snow, 2007, 2019; Garcia-López, 2010), depreciation
and filtering down in housing capital (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Rosenthal, 2008;
Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009), racial residential segregation (Boustan and Margo,
2013), and issues in coordinating redevelopment (Rosenthal and Ross, 2015; Brooks
and Lutz, 2016; Owens et al., 2019). After 2000, however, the residential distribution
reversed in most densely populated urban areas. The proportion of the population as
well as the relative income and proportion of college graduates began to grow again
in the central neighborhoods of US MAs and European cities including London and
Barcelona.
The recent residential recentralization is argued to be associated with a new neigh-
borhood housing cycle and neighborhood externalities (Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009;
Guerrieri et al., 2013), an increasing desire to save commuting time and enjoy the non-
tradable amenities in central areas (McKinnish et al., 2010; Lee and Lin, 2018; Su, 2019;
Couture and Handbury, 2020), changing labor market opportunities across locations
(Baum-Snow and Hartley, 2020), and policies on urban renewal and environmental
justice (Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins, 2011; González-Pampillón et al., 2020).1
Our study adds to the abovementioned literature by providing a new explanation for
residential decentralization (and recentralization) in an MA. By exploiting a real estate
bubble that occurred in the major MAs of Japan as a source of variation, we present the
first evidence of a mechanism where price fluctuations in the real estate market act as a
determinant of residential choices within an MA through land-use conversions. This
real estate bubble, beginning from the early 1980s and collapsing in the early 1990s,
was among the most aggressive in the history of Japan’s urban development. Violent
property price fluctuations mainly occurred in a relatively short period (one decade),
thereby ensuring that the demographic pattern and infrastructure construction that may
affect intra-MA population dynamics remained practically unchanged. This feature
allows us to clearly identify the causal relationship between land price fluctuations and
residential location dynamics.
The key idea behind our study is that central cities are likely to be dominated by
commercial properties when the economy is in an upswing. However, during the
economic downturn, land development shifts from commercial toward residential
construction. There are two theory-based reasons for this change. First, housing rents
in central cities are more inelastic than office and commercial rents; that is, the price
elasticity of demand for residential land is greater than that for commercial land. Second,
the land price elasticity of residential building height is smaller than that of commercial
buildings because the former has a smaller elasticity of substitution between land and
capital. In other words, in central cities in which land prices are rising, developers tend
1In addition, Boustan et al. (2019) investigated whether the massive investment in high-rise condo-
minium towers has contributed to urban gentrification. They found that condominium development has
no causal impact on residents’ income, although they are positively correlated.
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to increase the height of buildings to make full use of the value of the sky. Commercial
buildings are thus preferred over residential buildings and housing supply in central
cities compresses. This intensifies the commercial/residential segregation. On the
contrary, during an economic downturn, the supply of land for housing development
increases relatively, thereby encouraging residential recentralization.2
We examine whether changes in land development strategies have affected housing
supply and, in turn, residential choices by comparing the central city housing starts
and population growth performance with that in surrounding areas before, during,
and after the bubble period. The non-central surrounding areas are taken as the
comparison group because their land price changes during the bubble period were
much less significant. Therefore, land-use choices were less responsive to the bubble.
Our analyses are based on 285 urban municipalities in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs
(the two largest MAs of the country, covering nearly half the national population) in
1980–2017. The city of Tokyo (Osaka) is the central city of the Tokyo (Osaka) MA.
Before the empirical analysis, we first illustrate our ideas with prominent stylized
facts. We find that during the bubble economy (after the bubble burst), the price of
commercial land in central cities did rise (fall) much faster than the price of residential
land. Therefore, housing construction in central cities condensed (expanded). Consis-
tently, the residential population in central cities declined in the price-surging period
but grew significantly after the bubble burst. On the contrary, the daytime population,
which reflects the density of commercial activities, grew first and then shrank.3 (Unless
otherwise specified, the population in the study refers to the residential population; the
residential population and nighttime population are interchangeable.)
Our empirical analyses proceed as follows. First, using a cross-section regression,
we demonstrate that municipalities where land use focused more heavily on business
during the bubble period (measured by a more significant decline in commercial land
prices after the bubble burst and a lower nighttime population relative to the daytime
population in 1990–1995) experienced more housing starts and more remarkable popu-
lation growth in the subsequent decade. This result remains after controlling for initial
population density, distance from the city center, past scale of housing starts, and past
population growth. This result suggests that the more housing starts and faster popula-
tion growth in these areas might have been associated with more intensive land-use
conversions toward housing development after the bubble burst. Causal estimates
indicate that this mechanism can explain 10–20 percent of the post-1995 housing starts
and approximately 40 percent of the population growth in the central areas of our
sample MAs.
Second, we are concerned about the issue of reverse causality. The upsurge of
land-use conversions and housing construction in central cities triggered by the bub-
2"Residential recentralization" in our paper is slightly different than the implicit definition of "gen-
trification." The latter term is defined to represent the transformation of low-price, low-income neigh-
borhoods into areas dominated by high-income households and high-price houses. While it is true that
gentrified neighborhoods tend to be close to city centers, the analysis here is better termed "residential
recentralization," namely, the conversion of the city center from commercial to more intensive residential
land use.
3The daytime population is calculated as the nighttime population + the influx of commuters and
students from other areas − the outflow of commuters and students to other areas.
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ble bursting may affect population growth. At the same time, the opposite is also
possible. We find that the past scale of housing starts is positively correlated with
current population growth. However, lagged population growth cannot significantly
predict the current intensity of housing starts. In addition, under the assumption that
population growth has triggered a boom in housing construction, we expect that the
price of residential land in cities with faster population growth (higher demand for
residential land) should have increased relatively quickly. However, the fact is that
land prices in municipalities with faster population growth have fallen more sharply,
which further confirms that population growth in central cities is the result of increased
housing supply, not the cause.
Third, we examine the robustness of the initial result using a difference-in-differences
event-study specification. Our results still hold after controlling for the municipality-
specific linear time trends, using an alternative measure of the key variable, controlling
for a set of time-varying confounding factors that may be associated with residential
choices but not captured by two-way fixed effects, and regressing for a subsample
more likely to be involved in residential choices within the central city commuter zone.
Finally, advances in transportation technology, changes in employment opportunities,
and policies associated with land-use regulation could, in principle, affect residential
choices. To rule out these possibilities, we check the related information and find they
were largely unchanged during the study period.
We next provide extended results on the changes in the housing structure. High-
rise condominiums dominated new housing supply during the post-1995 central city
housing boom. Meanwhile, the proportion of commercial buildings in newly built
high-rise buildings has declined significantly. Moreover, new housing supply in central
cities was increasingly concentrated in large "built-to-sell" dwelling units (average floor
area of 70–100 sq.m), while most housing starts in the bubble period were for small
"built-to-rent" homes (40–60 sq.m). This transformation is in line with the improved
housing affordability and increased central city land supply for residential development
after the bubble burst.
Based on these results, we conclude that changes in land prices have affected the
conversion of land use between commercial and residential uses, which in turn has
affected housing supply and population growth in related areas. This mechanism
partially explains the recent residential recentralization in central Tokyo and Osaka.
Our study contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we are the first
study to explain the origin of residential recentralization from the perspective of land
price fluctuations and endogenous land-use conversion. This supply-side explanation
differs from the existing literature, which mainly employs a demand-side perspective
(e.g., changes in the locations of employment opportunities and residents’ preferences)
or posits it as the consequence of an exogenous urban renewal policy. Second, this
study is related to the literature on land-use conversion. Previous studies focus on the
conversion from farmland to urbanized land (Fu et al., 2019) or brownfield land to
residential buildings (Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins, 2013; Carozzi, 2020), which
mainly took place in the city periphery rather than in the center because the latter has
limited farmland and brownfield land. Our study is the first to document and analyze
the spatial consequences of the conversion from commercial to residential land use
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in city centers. Third, our research contributes to a small but growing stream of the
literature that identifies that volatility in real estate markets may have heterogeneous
within-city effects (Kwong and Leung, 2000; Kan et al., 2004; Landvoigt et al., 2015;
Liu et al., 2016). Liu et al. (2016) is particularly relevant to our study. They assessed
the within-city heterogeneity in response to the real estate bubble by focusing on the
US housing market (2000–2013), finding that during the bubble period, the relative
prices between the small and large home-size segments of the market were stable, but
that divergence emerged after the bubble burst (the price index for small houses fell
more because of the higher mortgage default rate).4 Our research differs from theirs by
focusing on the heterogeneous within-city effects on residential and commercial land.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background in-
formation. Section 3 introduces the hypotheses and data. Sections 4 and 5 detail the
empirical results and additional discussion, respectively. Section 6 concludes with
policy implications.
2 Background
2.1 Tokyo and Osaka MAs
We focus our analysis on the two largest MAs (Tokyo and Osaka) in Japan because
during the economic bubble, land prices in large cities tend to fluctuate more than in
small cities and their land use is more sensitive to land price changes. These two MAs
include nine of the 47 prefectures in the country (see Figure 1a), accounting for 44.6
percent of the population (as of 2015), although the land area only accounts for 8.9
percent of the total area.5 The economic agglomeration of the cities of Tokyo and Osaka
is even more extensive. They account for only 0.6 percent of the country’s land area but
accommodate 9.4 percent of the residential population and 11 percent of the daytime
population. Therefore, by studying these two MAs, we can systematically examine the
changes in residential choices in Japan’s densely populated urban areas.6
[Figure 1 about here]
The Tokyo and Osaka MAs are both highly polarized, with denser municipalities
located closer to the central city (see Figure A1). To measure the inter-MA population
dynamics, we further define a hierarchical structure with multiple levels of centrality.
Regarding the Tokyo MA, the first level is the entire MA (34 million residents in 2005),
4We find no evidence that mortgage default rates increased significantly in Japan after the bubble
burst, even for the small home-size segments of the market, which is different than the results of Liu et
al. for the United States. The high savings rate of Japanese households is a possible reason.
5The Tokyo MA includes four prefectures: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama. Tokyo prefecture
comprises the city of Tokyo (which consists of 23 municipality-level wards) and the surrounding
municipality-level cities, towns, and villages that are economically integrated with it. The Osaka MA
includes five prefectures: Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. Osaka prefecture comprises the
city of Osaka (which consists of 24 wards) and dozens of municipality-level administrative units.
6These two MAs cover all 55 high-density (10,000 residents per sq.km or higher in 1990) urban
municipalities in Japan (29 in Tokyo and 26 in Osaka).
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the second is the city of Tokyo (8.3 million), and the third (fourth) is the eight (three)
central municipality-level wards of Tokyo city, with 1.6 (0.3) million residents (see
Figure 1b). The eight central wards perform as Tokyo’s CBD, among which the density
of commercial activities in the three central wards (Chiyoda, Chuo, and Minato) is the
highest. The hierarchical structure of the Osaka MA is analogous, with the entire MA
(19.3 million residents) as the first level, the city of Osaka (2.5 million) as the second
level, and the three central wards (CBD; 200,000 residents) as the third level (Figure 1c).
The land area and population size of Osaka City are much smaller than those of Tokyo
City. Therefore, its CBD is relatively small, with only three wards.
2.2 Real estate bubble in the 1980s
Japan witnessed a bubble in the real estate market in the 1980s, with main property
appreciation occurring in its major MAs. This bubble peaked around 1990 and then
burst, resulting in a long period of land price decline. The causes of the bubble boom
and burst have been carefully studied in various streams of the literature and have been
attributed to external economic shocks (e.g., the 1985 Plaza Accord) and over-relaxed
macroeconomic policies (Kanemoto, 1997; Nakamura and Saita, 2007).
Heterogeneous price fluctuations in commercial and residential land. The left panel
of Figure 2 shows the land prices by commercial and residential use for Japan’s six
largest cities in 1980–2017 and the right panel shows the city of Tokyo.7 In each group
of samples, land prices increased dramatically in the 1980s. For instance, the price of
commercial land in the city of Tokyo increased seven-fold between 1980 and 1990.
[Figure 2 about here]
The price fluctuations in the commercial and residential land markets have been no-
tably different. Commercial land appreciated much more than residential land during
the bubble period, while after the bubble burst, commercial properties suffered greater
capital losses. For example, the commercial land price in the city of Tokyo fell to its 1980
level in 1998, whereas residential land maintained a capital return of 44 percent (taking
the 1980 price as a benchmark). In other words, after the bubble burst, the decrease in
demand and price of commercial space were greater than the decrease in housing (see
the red lines of Figure 2), which implies a higher comparative return from residential
development.8
7"The land price index for the six largest cities" represents the average land price changes of the six largest
cities in Japan, which is publicly released every year and widely used to reflect the price fluctuations of
the land market in Japan. The six largest cities are Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Kobe, Kyoto, and Nagoya,
of which all except Nagoya are in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs. The land price index by city is not publicly
released. Hence, we can only obtain relevant data for Tokyo, which were estimated by Shimizu and
Nishimura (2007) using land transaction data.
8These facts are in line with the analytical framework of property price fluctuations presented by
Kwong and Leung (2000) and Kan et al. (2004), which shows that the price variance of residential
property is likely to be lower than that of commercial property.
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Changes in housing supply. Figure 3 shows the scale of housing starts in the Tokyo
and Osaka MAs. Housing development in the CBDs of Tokyo and Osaka was con-
densed during the bubble period, as it was partially squeezed out by the commercial
development there. As described in Shimizu et al. (2010), office buildings and commer-
cial facilities were intensively constructed in Japan’s central urban areas in the late 1980s
and small houses and land were intensively bundled for commercial development
under a strong expectation of surging office rents. On the contrary, housing rent was
basically unchanged because of rent controls. According to Oizumi (1994), in the city of
Tokyo, the share of office space in the total floor area of buildings for all uses increased
from 11 percent in 1972 to 16 percent in 1990; in its three central wards, this figure
increased from 44 to 56 percent.
[Figures 3–5 about here]
However, a housing construction boom emerged in the central cities (particularly,
the CBDs) after the sharp decline in land prices.9 Specifically, the annual housing
starts in the three central wards of Tokyo remained stable below 500,000 sq.m during
1980–1993, however, this number soared to 1.7 million in 1994–2002 (Figure 3). During
the bubble period, the three (eight) central wards of Tokyo accounted for less than
5 (20) percent of the total housing starts in the city, but this proportion jumped to
approximately 19 (34) percent in the early 2000s (left panel of Figure 4). The city of
Tokyo’s share in the entire MA also rose.10 The right panel of Figure 4 displays a similar
pattern for Osaka. Indeed, the proportion of Tokyo and Osaka’s residential buildings in
the total floor area of building starts has been rising (i.e., the share of commercial and
office buildings has declined), since the collapse of the real estate bubble (Hirayama,
2005; for more details, see in Section 5).
Consistent with the changes in housing supply, the number of house tenures in
the cities of Tokyo and Osaka also decreased in the 1980s (Figure 5).11 Then, after the
downturn in property prices, housing transactions in both cities increased.
3 Hypotheses and data
Based on the abovementioned background information, we propose theory-based
testable hypotheses on the impacts of land price fluctuations on residential choices to
guide our empirical analysis.
During the bubble economy, the density of business activities in Tokyo and Osaka
9The MA-level scales of housing starts before and after the bubble burst were comparable; although
the scale of housing starts dropped in 1990–1992, it quickly recovered (Figure 3). Figure A2 further
compares the scale of housing starts in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs and other regions of Japan from 1980
to 2003, showing that their changes are essentially similar.
10Davidoff (2010) studied similar issues by focusing on Manhattan. He found that Manhattan’s share
of US residential construction has declined, which has been affected by changes in preferences and
regulations.
11In addition to supply-side factors, rising housing prices also lowered housing affordability and
depressed demand.
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increased due to the influx of capital and jobs. This led to increasingly concentrated
business activities in the CBD, which can be explained by two mechanisms: the well-
known agglomeration economies in production, as illustrated in the classic urban
economics literature such as Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg
(2002)12, and a supply-side factor recently introduced by Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018),
who found that the land price elasticity of building height is smaller for residential
than for commercial buildings because the elasticity of substitution between land and
capital is smaller.13 In the context of rising land prices, it is more desirable to develop
commercial buildings in central cities than residential buildings, so residential space
is squeezed out. We can therefore predict that during the real estate bubble, residential
development in central cities was compressed, causing a reduction in the nighttime population
and residential decentralization.
However, the situation reversed after the bursting of the real estate bubble. The
reduction in demand for commercial land in central cities highlights the advantages of
residential development because the overall residential demand is relatively stable. We
therefore predict that with the decline in land prices and decrease in demand for commercial
space, land developers shift their focus from commercial to residential use, leading to an increase
in the supply of housing in central cities and the recentralization of residents.
The aforementioned facts about the heterogeneous fluctuations in land prices and
changes in housing supply (Figures 2–5) justify these two mechanisms to a certain
extent. Moreover, the changes in office and housing rents also coincide with the
hypotheses. In central cities, the unit rent of office space is usually higher than the rent
of houses when other conditions (e.g., location) are the same. Based on a privately
collected database covering more than 10,000 rental contracts in the city of Tokyo from
1991 to 2004, Shimizu et al. (2010) found that only in a few peripheral areas were office
rents in 1991 lower than the corresponding housing rents on average. However, with
the bursting of the bubble economy, more office space rents fell below those of the
corresponding housing rents. This type of price inversion even appeared in the CBD of
Tokyo. This fact implies that after the bubble burst, the relative return on capital for
central city housing development rose.
Although Japan’s planning system prevents housing land from being used for other
purposes to some extent, no regulations prohibit the conversion of commercial land
into housing.14 Therefore, land-use conversion is legally feasible in central cities, as
12In addition, retail firms can benefit from shopping externalities, thereby making shops cluster in
shopping streets (Koster et al., 2019).
13Since unit construction costs increase with building height, there exists a correspondence between
land price and building height. In response to rising land prices, land developers will make buildings
taller. Using historical building height and land price data on Chicago, Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018)
found that it is more difficult to compensate residents than office users for the limited access to private
and communal exterior space, thereby making high-rise buildings more preferable for office use than
for residents. In addition, the building height elasticity of the construction cost is larger for residential
buildings (the cost of height is higher for residential than for commercial buildings because of notable
differences in the design of buildings). Moreover, Koster et al. (2013) suggested that office rents are
higher for high-rise buildings because of within-building agglomeration economies as well as landmark
and view effects.
14In some cases, changes in land-use nature from residential to commercial are permitted. In addition,
during the bubble period, some residential buildings were informally used for commercial and office
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shown by Shimizu et al. (2010). They found that because of the collapse of the bubble
economy, the vacancy rate of office buildings in Tokyo soared; the recession prompted
landlords to switch from commercial land to residential development. Moreover, as
stated by Hideo (2014), after the bubble burst, many companies affected by the debt
crisis had to sell their land assets that were previously used as parking lots or offices,
which were mainly converted into high-rise condominiums.
To test the hypotheses, we examine the effects of land price changes on the scale
of housing starts and population growth in central cities. Although examining the
number of land-use conversions is a direct way to test our hypotheses, commercial land
can be freely used for residential purposes without officially changing the land-use
nature, which makes relevant data downward biased. As an alternative to the number
of land-use conversions, we focus on the scale of housing starts.15
Although aggregate data on the population, land prices, and housing construction
are all available from 1980 to 2017, spatially disaggregated data (municipality-level) are
subject to some restrictions.16 The data on housing starts (in sq.m) per capita cover 1980
to 2003; the population data are from 1980 to 2015, but we focus on the main analyses
in the 1980–2003 period. The exclusion of data after 2003 is because Japan underwent a
nationwide municipality consolidation in the 2000s, which was mainly implemented in
2004–2006. The economic and demographic data of affected municipalities before and
after the mergers are therefore incomparable. Since land prices fluctuated sharply in
1985–1995, we do not expect the missing data after 2003 to affect the interpretation of
our results. Further, the mergers did not affect Tokyo and Osaka prefectures; hence, as
a robustness test, we analyze these subsamples using the data after 2003.
Our municipality-level data on annual land price changes are only available from
1993 to 2003. We therefore use the average commercial land price change in 1993, 1994,
and 1995 (denoted by ComLandPriceChg93−95i ) to reflect the extent of municipality i’s
land price decline after the bubble burst.17 As shown in Figure 2, the decline in land
prices between 1990 and 1995 was the most alarming. Since then, both commercial and
residential land prices have fallen relatively modestly.
4 Econometric specification and evidence
Our main econometric analysis is based on cross-sectional regression, although panel
data are available. Fixed-effects (within) regression allows us to address unobservable
and time-invariant interference factors; however, all cross-group variation will be
soaked up, leaving only the within-group variation. This method is therefore unable
purposes because office rents were higher than housing rents (Shimizu et al., 2010).
15New homes dominate the housing market in Japan because existing homes are discriminated against
in the mortgage market and homebuyers prefer them less; for more details, see Kobayashi (2016).
16Our disaggregated data are obtained from various sources; see Table A1.
17Figure A3 shows the distribution of the value of this indicator in these two MAs (nine prefectures)
and the rest of Japan (38 prefectures). Obviously, land prices mainly declined in these two MAs, with an
average drop of 12.8 percentage points compared with only 3 percentage points in other prefectures. The
decline in residential land prices was similar. These two MAs fell by an annual average of 5.7 percentage
points, while elsewhere it was 0.2 percentage points.
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to deal with the effects of variables with little within-group variation. As mentioned
previously, commercial land prices mainly declined in 1990–1995, after which the price
fluctuations were relatively limited (1996–2003).18 Thus, a within estimator may remove
most of the variation in our case.
4.1 Bubble bursting and the scale of housing starts
Our first regression models the link between the natural log of municipality i’s annual-
ized scale of housing starts per capita in 1996–2003 (ln(HS96−03i ))
19 and its commercial
land price change in 1993–1995 (ComLandPriceChg93−95i ), which is expressed as a per-
centage:
ln(HS96−03i ) = α + β1ComLandPriceChg
93−95
i + εi. (1)
β1 is expected to be negative because municipalities that experienced more drastic
commercial land price declines in 1993–1995 were likely to have stronger incentives to
convert commercial properties into houses afterward.
The estimated result for the Tokyo MA, as presented in column 1 of Table 1, sup-
ports our hypotheses. The estimated β1 is negative (-0.014) and statistically signif-
icant. We can interpret the result as follows. A one percentage point decrease in
ComLandPriceChg93−95i (sample mean of −14.2) implies an increase in the annualized
scale of housing starts per capita for the next eight years of 1.4 percent. To be specific, if
the land price of Tokyo’s CBD (the eight central wards) fell by the average level of the
MA in 1993–1995 (14.2 percentage points per year), instead of the actual value of 24
percentage points, its housing construction intensity of 1996–2003 would reduce from
1.83 to 1.47 sq.m per capita (a decrease of 19.7 percent).20
Second, we address the issue of omitted variables. The extent of the land price
decline after the bubble burst may be related to fundamentals, which would affect the
scale of housing investment in 1996–2003 through alternative channels (e.g., distance-
specific unobservables). We thus control for the distance between a municipality and
Tokyo station (the city center). As shown in Figure 6, municipalities closer to the city
center experienced a more dramatic drop in commercial land prices after the bubble
burst.21 We also control for the population density in 1995, which can influence the
intensity of residential development on the demand side. In addition, we include
housing starts per capita in the past decade (1986–1995) to take the pre-trends into
18Specifically, during 1993–1995, commercial land prices in Tokyo’s three central wards dropped by an
average of 30.1 percent per year, but during 1996–2003, they fell by only 6.5 percent per year.
19Specifically, ln(HS96−03i ) = ln(1+ annualized housing starts per capita in sq.m).
20During 1996–2003, the number of annual housing starts per capita in the eight central wards was 1.83
sq.m. If the extent of their land price decline during 1993–1995 was reduced from 24 to 14.2 percentage
points per year, the counterfactual intensity of housing starts would be exp[ln(1.83 + 1)− 0.014 × (24 −
14.2)]− 1 = 1.47 sq.m. Using similar calculations, this indicator for the city of Tokyo would drop from
1.25 to 1.03 (a decrease of 17.6 percent).
21If changes in residential land prices are used to replace changes in commercial land, the results are
similar but the fitting line is less steep (Figure 6). The difference in price changes between the two types
of land (ComLandPriceChg93−95i − ResLandPriceChg
93−95
i ) is also positively related to the distance from
the city center (with a slope (s.e.) of 0.05 (0.02) for Tokyo), which means that the relative capital loss of
commercial land in central urban areas was greater, creating a stronger incentive for land-use conversion.
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account. The estimated coefficient shown in column 2 of Table 1 is consistent with the
baseline result: β1 is still negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level,
although the value is reduced by half compared with column 1.
[Table 1 and Figures 6 and 7 about here]
We are also concerned about the measurement issues of ComLandPriceChg93−95i
since we lack information on the land price change in 1990–1992 when the real estate
bubble had just burst. Given this limitation, we use an alternative measure (the night-
time population to the daytime population ratio (NDPR) in 1990 and 1995) to check
that our results on the association between land price fluctuations and the subsequent
scale of housing starts are robust. The lower the NDPR, the more employment-oriented
the municipality’s functions are, meaning that the past intensity of commercial de-
velopment will be greater than that of housing development.22 Such a municipality
is therefore more likely to have experienced large land price declines and land-use
conversions after the bubble burst. Data on the daytime population are only available
for Tokyo and Osaka prefectures and are disclosed every five years. Therefore, we
use the two-year average of 1990 and 1995 to calculate the NDPR for 1990–1995. The
two measures, namely, ComLandPriceChg93−95i and NDPR
90&95
i , are closely related. As
shown in Figure 7, the correlation coefficient across the municipalities of Tokyo prefec-
ture is 0.68. The estimation result using this alternative measure is highly consistent, as
shown in column 3 of Table 1. After controlling for the distance from the city center,
initial population density, and pre-trends, a lower NDPR is still associated with a higher
post-1995 scale of housing starts. As a reference, we present the corresponding results
of this Tokyo prefecture subsample, referring to the specification for column 2; the
estimated key coefficient is essentially unchanged (column 4).
We then conduct regressions with the data on Osaka, which are highly consistent
with the results of Tokyo. The corresponding results are found in columns 5–8 of Table
1, which follow the same presentation order as columns 1–4.23
4.2 Bubble bursting and residential choices
We next examine the effects of land price fluctuations on residential population growth.
Before we introduce the empirical strategy, Figure 8 displays the population growth
of each hierarchy of the Tokyo and Osaka MAs from 1980 to 2017. This graph reveals
many striking patterns. Although the two MAs, as a whole, exhibit solid population
growth, their central locations declined significantly during the bubble period. The
population of central cities then rebounded after the dramatic land price decline in
22The nighttime population of municipalities with many labor-intensive factories will also be much
smaller than the daytime population. In this case, the lower NDPR is not related to higher commercial
density, which can cause measurement problems. However, all our sample municipalities with a low
NDPR are located in central urban areas, where there are few factories.
23We also report the result of the Osaka MA after excluding the data of Hyogo prefecture (column
1 of Table A2), because Kobe—the capital city of Hyogo—was hit by an earthquake in 1995 (the Han-
shin earthquake), which led to its reconstruction in the next decade. The result after considering this
confounding factor is essentially unchanged.
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1990–1995. The post-1995 population increase in central city areas has been much faster
than that in the wider metropolitan region.
[Table 2 and Figures 8 and 9 about here]
Figure 9 (left panel), which displays the daytime population in central cities, further
supports our hypotheses. The dynamics of the daytime population were inversely
proportional to those of the nighttime population, which grew in central locations
during 1980–1990 but decreased after the bubble burst. More central locations exhibited
stronger growth during the bubble period. For example, the three central wards
of Tokyo (Osaka) reached an extremely high level of daytime population density
(63,000 (51,000) people per sq.km) in 1990 but then lost 14 (16) percent of their daytime
population in the subsequent two decades. Thus, the NDPR first declined (i.e., land
space was increasingly dominated by commercial use) during 1980–1995 and then
rebounded after 1995 (Figure 9, right panel), implying that the commercial/residential
segregation in central cities first exacerbated and then weakened.
The regression model is similar to Equation (1), except that we replace the LHS










Column 1 of Table 2 shows that β2 is estimated to be −0.047 and statistically significant
at the 1 percent level for the Tokyo MA. Hence, a one percentage point decrease in
ComLandPriceChg93−95i implies a 0.05-point increase in the annual population growth
rate for the next eight years. To be specific, if the land price of the eight central wards
(the city of Tokyo) fell by the average level of the MA (14.2 percentage points) in 1993–
1995, the annual population growth rate in 1996–2003 would reduce from 0.99 (0.59) to
0.53 (0.25) percentage points.24 That is, the heterogeneous land price changes between
central and non-central urban areas after the bubble burst can explain more than 40
percent of the subsequent population growth in central areas.
Similar to Table 1, we present the estimation results with additional control variables
(distance from the city center, initial population density, and past population growth
(1986–1995)) in column 2. The estimated β2 is basically unchanged in both significance
and magnitude. Column 3 takes the NDPR as an alternative explanatory variable
and column 4 is an estimate with a subsample for Tokyo prefecture. These results are
largely consistent with our hypotheses (the only exception is that the NDPR coefficient
in column 3 is not statistically significant (p-value=0.14)). That is, municipalities that
experienced greater declines in commercial land prices after the bubble burst have
experienced more significant population growth since 1995.
Moreover, we replace the LHS variable with the average annual population growth




20 × 100) to examine the
24We have 0.99− 0.047× (24− 14.2) = 0.53 and 0.59− 0.047× (21.5− 14.2) = 0.25 for the eight central
wards and city of Tokyo, respectively (ComLandPriceChg93−95i equals −24 (−21.5) for the eight central
wards (the city of Tokyo)).
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robustness of our findings. Columns 5 and 6 show the related results, which support
our hypotheses as well. Columns 7–12 of Table 2 show all the corresponding regression
results based on Osaka data, which are highly consistent with those for Tokyo (the
only exception is that the coefficient of ComLandPriceChg93−95i in column 10 is not
significant (p-value=0.14)).25
4.3 Dealing with reverse causality
We are concerned about the issue of reverse causality. First, the macroeconomic factors
that triggered the bursting of the economic bubble were not affected by residential
choices in Japan’s major cities. Indeed, the economic bubble affected other sectors
such as the stock market as well. Therefore, the exogeneity assumption is satisfied in
analyzing the impacts of the bubble bursting on residential recentralization. Second, we
need to examine the possibility that the housing boom caused by changes in land-use
patterns in central cities was simply the result of population growth there. It is also hard
to hold this view because the population influx occurred after, not before, the housing
construction boom. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, the housing expansion in central
cities started to intensify during 1993–1995 (we show the scale of housing starts by
housing type in Section 5.2, which clarifies that the housing boom started before 1995).
However, population growth in central cities did not turn from negative to positive
until 1995 (Figure 8).
To formally examine the causal relationship between housing starts and population
growth, we introduce a simplified implementation of Granger causality testing. For
a specific year t, we regress the average intensity of housing starts in municipality













i )] + εi. (3)
If reverse causality exists, γ will be significantly positive; however, we find that most of
the estimated slopes are not statistically significant or negative (Figure 10; left panel for
Tokyo and right panel for Osaka). When t = 1999, the intensity of housing starts (mean
1996–1999) was not significantly correlated with population growth in the previous four
years (= ln(pop1995i )− ln(pop
1991
i )).
26 By setting t two years forward to 2000 and 2001
or two years backward to 1997 and 1998, the results are similar. There is no systematic
positive correlation (only the related fitted lines are displayed in Figure 10 because of
space constraints).27
25The result of the Osaka MA after excluding the data of Hyogo prefecture remain as well, which is
reported in column 2 of Table A2.
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are similar.
27When t = 2001, we examine the relationship between the intensity of housing starts in 1998–2001




[Figures 10–12 about here]
By contrast, by exchanging the LHS and RHS variables of Equation (3), namely,
using lagged housing construction intensity to predict recent population growth, we
find that the relationship is consistently positive and statistically significant in all the
regression exercises (Figure 11; left panel for Tokyo and right panel for Osaka). These
results imply that the increasing number of housing starts after the bubble burst drove
population growth in the central cities, not the reverse.
Furthermore, we consider the differential price responses between the supply-side
and demand-side explanations. In the case that housing supply increased because
demand was growing, we expect that residential land prices should have increased
as a consequence of the positive demand shock. On the contrary, if the increasing
number of housing starts was motivated by supply-side factors, the residential land
price is expected to have declined (see a simple illustration in Figure A4). It is therefore
straightforward to distinguish between these two mechanisms by checking the relation-
ship between the residential land price change and scale of housing starts. They are
expected to be negatively correlated if the latter explanation holds true.
Figure 12 shows the relationship between a municipality’s residential land price
change (mean 1993–2003; expressed as a percentage) and the natural log of housing
starts per capita (mean 1993–2003, denoted by ln(HS93−03i )) across the Tokyo MA
municipalities in the left panel and across the Osaka MA municipalities in the right
panel. We find a negative correlation (solid lines). That is, the more the housing supply
in a municipality increased, the more its residential land price fell. This negative
correlation still exists after controlling for the distance between a municipality and
the city center (dashed lines).28 This suggests that the non-positive link between the
residential land price change and intensity of housing starts in the study period does not
simply reflect differences in time-invariant locational heterogeneity, which is consistent
with our supply-side interpretation.
4.4 Event-study evidence
The cross-sectional analysis has a limitation since we cannot control for all the structural
differences between municipalities because of our limited control variables. To address
this issue, we provide further evidence on the timing of changes in the central city
intensity of housing starts and population growth relative to the bubble boom and
burst using a difference-in-differences event-study specification and municipality-level
data for the Tokyo and Osaka MAs in 1980–2003. The regression model is as follows:






t ) + δi + σt + (µi × t) + εi,t, (4)
where CBDi is a dummy variable taking the value of one for the eight central wards of
Tokyo (for the case of Osaka, it refers to the three central wards since its CBD is smaller
28We first obtain the housing start residuals from the regression of ln(HS93−03i ) on ln (distance from
Tokyo/Osaka station) and then regress the residuals on the residential land price change.
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than that of Tokyo) and zero otherwise; timeat is a set of individual year dummies (1981–
2003), which takes the value of one if t = a and zero otherwise. The intensity of housing
starts in 1980 is therefore taken as the benchmark. δi and σt capture municipality and
year fixed effects, respectively. The former controls for all the time-invariant differences
between municipalities, while the latter controls for the time-variant changes that
similarly affect all municipalities such as the negative income shock due to the bubble
bursting. We also consider a municipality-specific linear time trend (µi × t) to capture
the timing of deviations from the municipality trends. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipality level.
[Figure 13 about here]
Our key coefficients of interest are ρa, which capture the treatment effect of the
bubble boom and burst on the relative intensity of housing starts of the CBD and
non-central area (the remaining municipalities in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs); the
latter is taken as the comparison group because its land prices and land-use patterns
were relatively stable during the bubble economy. The top panels of Figure 13 display
the estimated treatment effects (ρa) from Equation (4) and the 95 percent confidence
intervals (left panel for Tokyo MA and right panel for Osaka MA). For 1980–1984,
when the bubble did not expand dramatically, the estimated treatment effects are not
significant, which implies no evidence of significant deviations from the municipality
trends before the boom. The estimated coefficients then become significantly negative
during the boom. As the bubble burst after 1990, the estimated coefficients gradually
turn positive. In sum, we find unsubtle deviations in the intensity of housing starts
from the municipality-specific time trends after 1985.
By replacing the LHS variable with municipality i’s population in year t (ln(popti)),
we obtain the related results for residential growth, which are shown in the bottom
panels of Figure 13. Again, we find no evidence of significant deviations from the trends
before the boom. The CBD population declined relative to the comparison group in
1985–1994 and rebounded after 1995. It is thus evident that both the scale of residential
development and population growth responded to the bubble boom and burst, as we
hypothesized.
To make it easier to interpret the coefficients, we consider more parsimonious model
specifications by assuming that the effects of the bubble boom and burst are the same
within a five-year period (1980–1984: before the bubble boom; 1985–1989: bubble boom-
ing; 1990–1994: bubble bursting; 1995–1999 and 2000–2003: recovery from the crash).
In addition, we define the central city area in a more general manner. Considering the
Tokyo MA as an example, our augmented regression takes the following form:


















t ) + δi + σt + (µi × t) + εi,t,
(5)
where C3 is a dummy variable taking the value of one for the three central wards of
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Tokyo and zero otherwise, C8excl.C3 is a dummy variable equal to one for the remain-
ing five of the eight central wards of Tokyo (excluding the three central wards), and
CCexcl.CBD is a dummy variable denoting the remaining 15 wards of the city of Tokyo
(excluding its eight central wards) (for Osaka MA, C3 refers to the three central wards
of Osaka city (the CBD) and CCexcl.CBD denotes its remaining 21 wards; C8excl.C3
does not apply in the case of Osaka). The peripheral municipalities outside the city of
Tokyo are set as the comparison. Pat (a = 1 to 4) are period dummy variables for the
four periods (1985–1989, 1990–1994, 1995–1999, and 2000–2003; 1980–1984 is set as the
benchmark. The other variables are the same as in Equation (4).
[Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 14 about here]
The top panels of Figure 14 show the estimated treatment effects (ρa, φa, and ψa)
from Equation (5) and the 95 percent confidence intervals, with the full regression
results reported in Table 3 (columns 1 and 5 for Tokyo and Osaka, respectively). Taking
the Tokyo MA as an example, relative to the base period and comparison group, the
per capita scale of housing starts in the three central wards of Tokyo decreased by
24.5 (= 1 − exp(−0.281)) and 45.3 percent (= 1 − exp(−0.603)) during 1985–1989 and
1990–1994, respectively. Thereafter, this indicator began to rebound, which was not
significantly different from the base period (relative to the comparison group) after
2000. For the groups of C8excl.C3 and CCexcl.CBD, the inter-periodic fluctuation of the
estimated coefficients is relatively small, but the pattern is similar (i.e., the estimated
coefficients first declined and then rebounded). The Osaka results, as shown in the
top-right panel of Figure 14, and estimated results of replacing the LHS variable with
ln(popti), as displayed in the bottom panels (the full regression results are reported
in Table 4; columns 1 and 5 for Tokyo and Osaka, respectively), are highly consistent.
Specifically, the population in the three central wards of Tokyo (C3) decreased by 8
(= 1 − exp(−0.083)) and 16.8 percent (= 1 − exp(−0.184)) in 1985–1989 and 1990–
1994, respectively (compared to the control group) and the remaining five CBD wards
(CCexcl.CBD) decreased by 3.2 and 8.4 percent. However, similar to the scale of housing
starts, the gaps have both closed after 2000.
To further explore the robustness of our results, we examine many alternative
specifications and samples. First, we use the natural log of the distance from the city
center instead of the set of central city dummies (C3, C8excl.C3, and CCexcl.CBD)
in Equation (5). The results displayed in columns 2 and 6 of Table 3 for Tokyo and
Osaka, respectively remain sound. We find that the scale of residential development in
municipalities closer to the city center became smaller during 1985–1994; however, after
2000, this gap closed. Second, we add control variables to mitigate the omitted variable
problem. Municipality i’s area of parks in year t as well as the number of clinics and
gender balance of the residential population are included to measure amenities, the
provision of public facilities, and the demographic structure, respectively, which are
expected to be associated with residential choices.29 Columns 3 and 7 of Table 3 report
29Data on the area of parks are obtained from the Prefectural Statistics supplied by the Prefectural
Statistical Bureau. Data on the number of clinics are obtained from the Health Statistics Office, the
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare. The gender balance of the residential population is measured
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the results for Tokyo and Osaka, respectively, which are consistent with our previous
estimates, although the number of observations is lower.
Our results are also robust to the exclusion of remote peripheral municipalities. As
shown in Figure A1, remote peripheral municipalities in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs
are less populated; they are relatively extraneous regarding residential choices and
commuter behavior in central cities. When excluding municipalities 30 km or further
from Tokyo (or Osaka) station, the results remain, as presented in columns 4 and 8 of
Table 3 for Tokyo and Osaka, respectively.
We finally replace the dependent variable with the natural log of the residential
population and the results are highly consistent again. Columns 2–4 and 6–8 of Table 4
provide the corresponding results for Tokyo and Osaka, respectively, which follow the
same presentation order as Table 3.
4.5 Other contributing factors
Aside from the mechanisms we have introduced, other factors may account for our
findings. We here present several pieces of additional evidence that residential recen-
tralization in central city areas was driven by land-use conversions rather than by these
alternative explanations.
First, advances in transportation facilities could play a role in reshaping the urban
spatial structure (Baum-Snow, 2007). However, we find that after 1985, there was no
substantial development of the inter-regional (high-speed railroads and expressways)
or intra-regional (city roads and urban rail transits) transportation infrastructures in
Tokyo and Osaka.30 Second, land-use regulation or zoning may influence the urban
spatial structure and housing markets (Davidoff, 2010; Cheshire et al., 2018), which
will affect the interpretation of our results. The Obuchi (1998–2000) and Koizumi
(2001–2006) Cabinets adopted urban regeneration as a way for large cities to regain
their competitiveness and address the recession after the bubble burst (Hirayama, 2017).
Thus, policies including the deregulation of urban planning have been implemented
since 1998. However, these policies favoring central city regeneration did not make
substantial progress until the late 1990s, whereas the housing construction boom in
central cities began in the early 1990s. Therefore, the observed central city housing
boom was unlikely to be triggered by related planning policies, although they might
have pushed it forward to some extent. Third, public housing or other local welfare
policies may have influenced residential choices (Fiva, 2009; Tach and Emory, 2017). As
discussed by Xu and Zhou (2019), public housing units in the major cities of Japan were
largely built before 1980. Since then, the main effort on public housing was to maintain
existing buildings. Since the vacancy rate of public housing in Tokyo and Osaka has
always been low and the economic composition of tenants has been stable over time
as the absolute value of (female population/population−0.5), which is obtained from the Residential
Population Survey conducted by the Local Administration Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications.
30In addition, transport revolution, if any, is likely to result in residential decentralization than
recentralization. For example, there was a sharp divergence between the nighttime (declined) and
daytime populations (increased) in London after the mid-19th century owing to the transport revolution
from the invention of steam railways; see Heblich et al. (2020).
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(Xu and Zhou, 2019), the maintenance of public housing cannot explain the central city
population growth since the 1990s.
[Figure 15 about here]
Finally, changes in the location of employment opportunities can also affect resi-
dential choices (Baum-Snow and Hartley, 2020). If employment in central city grows
rapidly, this may make living in the CBD more attractive. However, Figure 15 (see also
the left panel of Figure 9) shows that the number of jobs in central cities did not increase
after the bubble burst.
5 Changes in the housing structure
As an extension, we further examine whether land price fluctuations and residential
recentralization have structurally changed the housing supply in central cities, which
could inform decision-making on housing and zoning-related policies.
5.1 Residential buildings are taller
Although land in central cities became relatively cheap after the bubble burst, it is still
too scarce to be used for low-density housing (e.g., detached house). Therefore, we
expect that the new supply in the post-1995 central city housing boom should be mainly
high-rise condominiums. In addition, the new construction of high-rise commercial
and office buildings is expected to have declined relatively.
Table 5 (panel A) shows the housing supply in the city of Tokyo from 1998 to 2013
(earlier data are not available). It increased by 33 percent, much higher than the popu-
lation growth of 12 percent over the same period. The situation in Osaka was similar,
where housing supply grew rapidly (panel B).31 Further, condominiums in buildings
with six stories or more were the largest source of new housing supply after 1998,
among which those in buildings with 15 stories or more grew the most.
[Tables 5–7 about here]
Table 6 further displays the stock and locations of Tokyo prefecture’s high-rise
buildings (data for other prefectures are not available) in 1980–2010. The number
of high-rise buildings grew rapidly, among which buildings with 13 stories or more
increased the most. The high-rise buildings newly built during our study period were
mainly concentrated in the central city. Moreover, the more central the location, the
higher the proportion of residents living in high-rise buildings. For Chuo, Chiyoda, and
Minato (the three central wards of Tokyo) in 2015, 64, 50, and 46 percent of households
lived in buildings with 11 stories or more, respectively (data sources: the 2015 National
Population Census). For the remaining five wards of Tokyo’s CBD, this figure is
31Since housing construction takes a certain amount of time, the housing stock in 1998 was mainly
housing units built before the bubble burst.
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marginally lower, ranging between 21 and 47 percent, but still much higher than the
average of the entire Tokyo city (16 percent). This ratio is further lower in areas outside
Tokyo. The situation in Osaka is similar.
Next, Table 7 reports the number of new high-rise buildings distinguished by
commercial and residential use. According to our hypotheses, owing to land-use
conversion, commercial (residential) use should have reduced (increased). Table 7
confirms that the proportion of super high-rise buildings (60 meters or higher) used
for residential purposes in Tokyo prefecture indeed increased (related data for Osaka
prefecture are not available). For the super high-rise buildings built during the bubble
period (some were completed between 1990 and 1994 because construction took several
years), only about 15 percent were used for residential purposes. However, in the
following decades, more new developments focused on residential purposes and the
proportion of commercial and office uses fell. The latter coincides with the fact that the
daytime population of the central city decreased after the bubble burst, as shown in
Figure 9.
Although seemingly fragmented, the discussion above verifies that after the bubble
burst, land development in central cities was increasingly focused on high-rise condo-
miniums. Although the data in Tables 5–7 come from various sources and are subject to
limited availability (i.e., the definitions of high-rise buildings and geographical scope
differ), we do not expect the reliability of the above discussion to be substantially
compromised because all the stylized facts are compatible with each other.
5.2 House size is larger
The structure of housing starts in terms of house size changed substantially after the
bubble burst. Figure 16 displays the average floor space of housing starts in our sample
MAs and central cities. They all declined in the 1980s and then increased after the
bursting of the real estate bubble. Figure A5 shows the intensity of housing starts
distinguished by "built-to-sell" (mainly condominiums) and "built-to-rent" housing
(mainly single-bedroom apartments).32 Note that the average floor area of "built-to-sell"
housing (70–100 sq.m) is significantly larger than that of "built-to-rent" housing (40–60
sq.m), although they are both smaller than owner-occupied houses (110–140 sq.m)
(see Figure A6). We find that during the bubble period, the scale of housing starts on
"built-to-rent" dwellings peaked, perhaps because of surging housing prices, which
lowered the affordability of decent housing. After the bubble burst, land developers
began to build larger dwellings in central cities because of improved affordability,
leading to the dominance of "built-to-sell" housing since the early 1990s.
[Table 8 and Figures 16 and 17 about here]
Moreover, we find that the more central the location, the more significant the changes
in the average dwelling size of housing starts after the bubble economy. By replacing the
32Between 1980 and 2017, "build-to-sell" and "build-to-rent" housing accounted for more than 70
percent of the new housing supply in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs. For central cities, this proportion was
above 80 percent.
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LHS variable of Equation (5) with the ratio of "built-to-sell" dwellings in total housing
starts, we find that this ratio first declined in central cities during the bubble period and
then increased after the bubble burst (columns 1 and 3 of Table 8 for Tokyo and Osaka,
respectively); further, more central areas fluctuated more on this indicator. To avoid the
bias from changes in the construction scale of owner-occupied homes, which were less
market-driven, we take the proportion of "built-to-sell" dwellings to total "built-to-sell"
and "built-to-rent" dwellings (sell_ratio) as the dependent variable. The results remain
the same (columns 2 and 4). This changing housing development strategy is consistent
with the increasing income of residents in central cities accompanied by residential
recentralization. For example, the taxable income of the residents in the three central
wards of Tokyo was 1.37 times that of the city average during 1990–1995. This figure
increased to 1.61 in 2005 and 1.69 in 2015 (data sources: the Residential Population
Survey of Japan, various years).33
This housing development strategy only changed in our sample MAs. For other
prefectures, the changes in sell_ratio are relatively limited (the left panel of Figure
17). More specifically, the changes in the housing development strategy were highly
correlated with the degree of land price changes. The right panel of Figure 17 shows
the change in sell_ratio at the prefecture level between 1986–1990 (during the bubble
boom) and 1996–2000 (after the bubble burst), which is negatively associated with
ComLandPriceChg93−95. The sell_ratio of the Tokyo and Osaka MAs (prefecture average)
in 1996–2000 increased by 30 and 11 percentage points from their levels in 1986–1990,
respectively. On the contrary, for those prefectures not significantly affected by the real
estate bubble, this indicator remained basically unchanged.34 This provides further
support for our view. That is, if the changes in the housing development strategy
in our sample areas were caused by factors such as changes in national building
standards, taxation, and residents’ preferences, rather than land price fluctuations,
other prefectures should have shown similar trends.
6 Concluding remarks
We identify a new supply-side cause of residential recentralization by studying the
effects of a real estate bubble and its bursting on intra-MA residential choices in the
Tokyo and Osaka MAs. In response to land price fluctuations in central cities, land
developers tend to increase (decrease) housing construction and decrease (increase)
commercial development when land prices fall (rise). Consequently, housing supply
in central cities increases (decreases), thereby encouraging residential recentralization
(suburbanization). These endogenous changes in land development strategy influence
residential choices and the urban spatial structure.
Since relative demand for these two types of land changes significantly with the
economic cycle, rigid and immutable land-use regulations, if any, may exacerbate
33These facts are consistent with the changes in income composition found in existing studies of
gentrification. However, it is worth emphasizing that the scope of the current analysis does not formally
include changes in residents’ income across locations due to limited data availability.
34If changes in residential land prices are used to replace changes in commercial land prices, the
negative correlation still exists (dashed line in the right panel of Figure 17).
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land market frictions to some extent, resulting in a decline in efficiency. To make
more informed policy and investment decisions, publicizing longitudinal data on the
vacancy rates (or rents) of residential and commercial properties and the population
(both daytime and nighttime) at the micro level may help local governments, land
developers, and property holders identify changes in demand for specific land types.
On the one hand, facilitating the timely implementation of land-use conversions when
land demand has undergone structural changes can improve efficiency. On the other
hand, residential space needs to be offered in balance to ensure that the central city
can perpetuate the agglomeration economies in production and grow sustainably.
Otherwise, commercial-to-residential conversions may come at the expense of urban
productivity. In addition, because of the need to change building standards, switching
between the residential and commercial functions of a building is complicated in
practice. Therefore, complex residential and commercial buildings that allow for the
more flexible conversion of commercial and residential functions without tearing down
and rebuilding the structure are worth investment in central cities.
Our findings for Tokyo and Osaka are representative of those in other large MAs
globally. For instance, there has been a large increase in the number of offices and shops
converted into apartments in London and other British cities since 2015.35 This boom
is partly down to the new "Permitted Development Rights" approved in 2015, which
allow developers to proceed without conventional planning permission (Collinson,
2016; McDonald, 2018). Similar land-use conversions have also occurred in New
York, San Francisco, and Chicago (Jackson, 2014) as well as in Sydney (Cummins,
2014; Cranston, 2018).36 In addition to advanced economies, China has also been
open to converting vacant commercial buildings and land into residential use after the
softening of the land designation rules in 2016, calling for more commercial spaces
to be converted into housing in its large cities as a way to ease the oversupply of
offices and shopping malls (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2016;
Cooper, 2019). An immediate application of our research is to assess the impact of the
coronavirus outbreak on the hospitality industry. The epidemic caused travel to almost
cease in the first half of 2020, and the hotel occupancy rate has declined severely. As
a result, many hotels in downtown districts as well as related companies that have
been devastated by the epidemic have been permanently closed. The findings of the
current research indicate that these spaces may be used for residential purposes in the
future. As a result, the epidemic may unintentionally affect the future spatial structures
of cities.
35The rate of office-to-residential conversions in England went up by nearly 40 percent between 2016
and 2017, which was due to many small businesses being forced to shut down due to the mounting cost
of business rates (Zoopla Property Group, 2019).
36The returns on residential development make a commercial-to-residential conversion competitive,
which took place not only in Class B office buildings across Manhattan’s commercial districts, but also in
well-known high-rise buildings such as the Sony Building (Putzier, 2014).
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Table 1: Land price changes and the scale of housing starts. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Tokyo MA Osaka MA 
 
ln(housing starts per capita)  
(mean 1996–2003) 
ln(housing starts per capita)  
(mean 1996–2003) 
Commercial land price change (%) -0.014 -0.007  -0.014 -0.010 -0.008  -0.008 
(mean 1993–1995) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) 
NDPR (mean 1990&1995)   -0.202    -0.468  
   (0.071)    (0.072)  
ln(distance from city center)  -0.102 -0.142 -0.152  -0.023 0.013 -0.097 
  (0.032) (0.026) (0.028)  (0.023) (0.026) (0.037) 
ln(population per sq.km 1995)  -0.020 -0.131 -0.184  0.002 -0.013 -0.067 
  (0.017) (0.053) (0.053)  (0.019) (0.028) (0.039) 
ln(housing starts p.c.) (mean 1986–1995)  0.341 0.677 0.525  0.354 0.488 0.597 
  (0.070) (0.240) (0.229)  (0.142) (0.155) (0.186) 
Obs. 163 163 47 47 122 122 56 56 
R-sq 0.294 0.440 0.698 0.729 0.201 0.294 0.712 0.492 
Notes: The constant term coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 2: Land price changes and residential population growth. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Tokyo MA Osaka MA 
 residential population growth rate (%) residential population growth rate (%) 
 (mean 1996–2003) (mean 1996–2015) (mean 1996–2003) (mean 1996–2015) 
Commercial land price change -0.047 -0.043  -0.062  -0.037 -0.024 -0.030  -0.024  -0.046 
(%) (mean 1993–1995) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.018) 
NDPR (mean 1990&1995)   -0.765  -0.865    -1.757  -2.615  
   (0.515)  (0.378)    (0.493)  (0.401)  
ln(distance from city center)  -0.285 -0.299 -0.292 -0.460 -0.499  -0.122 -0.010 -0.430 -0.058 -0.673 
  (0.107) (0.206) (0.201) (0.153) (0.164)  (0.095) (0.169) (0.134) (0.136) (0.158) 
ln(population per sq.km 1995)  0.068 -0.172 -0.358 -0.169 -0.401  -0.059 -0.325 -0.662 -0.159 -0.643 
  (0.052) (0.270) (0.235) (0.213) (0.214)  (0.077) (0.176) (0.139) (0.156) (0.157) 
population growth rate (%)  0.340 0.319 0.305 0.177 0.071  0.204 0.295 0.080 0.181 -0.080 
(mean 1986–1995)  (0.046) (0.204) (0.164) (0.154) (0.129)  (0.043) (0.157) (0.178) (0.161) (0.200) 
Obs. 163 163 47 47 47 47 122 122 56 56 55 55 
R-sq 0.166 0.453 0.153 0.303 0.587 0.592 0.049 0.175 0.417 0.251 0.656 0.453 
Notes: The constant term coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For columns 11–12, the sample size is reduced 
from 56 to 55 because the city of Sakai in Osaka prefecture merged the surrounding rural areas in 2006, making its data before and after 2006 
incomparable.
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Table 3: Event-study results for the scale of housing starts. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Tokyo MA Osaka MA 
 ln(housing starts per capita) ln(housing starts per capita) 
C3 * yr 1985–89 -0.281  -0.321 -0.280 -0.259  -0.222 -0.262 
 (0.101)  (0.114) (0.102) (0.080)  (0.071) (0.082) 
C3 * yr 1990–94 -0.603  -0.664 -0.558 -0.554  -0.533 -0.551 
 (0.089)  (0.101) (0.092) (0.184)  (0.179) (0.187) 
C3 * yr 1995–99 -0.207  -0.259 -0.188 -0.240  -0.141 -0.303 
 (0.209)  (0.212) (0.212) (0.289)  (0.303) (0.297) 
C3 * yr 2000–03 0.149  0.091 0.150 0.063  0.135 -0.008 
 (0.325)  (0.317) (0.329) (0.327)  (0.366) (0.334) 
(C8-C3) * yr 1985–89 -0.081  -0.075 -0.080     
 (0.052)  (0.058) (0.054)     
(C8-C3) * yr 1990–94 -0.225  -0.230 -0.179     
 (0.063)  (0.076) (0.066)     
(C8-C3) * yr 1995–99 -0.043  -0.022 -0.023     
 (0.061)  (0.080) (0.069)     
(C8-C3) * yr 2000–03 -0.009  0.049 -0.008     
 (0.074)  (0.080) (0.082)     
(CC-CBD) * yr 1985–89 -0.013  -0.014 -0.012 -0.018  -0.027 -0.022 
 (0.026)  (0.027) (0.028) (0.032)  (0.039) (0.036) 
(CC-CBD) * yr 1990–94 -0.111  -0.126 -0.065 -0.204  -0.228 -0.201 
 (0.035)  (0.035) (0.040) (0.049)  (0.075) (0.055) 
(CC-CBD) * yr 1995–99 -0.051  -0.061 -0.032 -0.194  -0.190 -0.257 
 (0.044)  (0.050) (0.054) (0.068)  (0.100) (0.088) 
(CC-CBD) * yr 2000–03 -0.022  -0.015 -0.021 -0.126  -0.148 -0.197 
 (0.052)  (0.059) (0.063) (0.080)  (0.119) (0.096) 
ln(dist.) * yr 1985–89  0.035    0.019   
  (0.015)    (0.013)   
ln(dist.) * yr 1990–94  0.125    0.095   
  (0.019)    (0.022)   
ln(dist.) * yr 1995–99  0.044    0.057   
  (0.024)    (0.028)   
ln(dist.) * yr 2000–03  -0.015    0.020   
  (0.034)    (0.031)   
Municipality-specific linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Two-way FEs X X X X X X X X 
Controls   X    X  
Subsample (<30km)    X    X 
Obs. 3,860 3,860 2,895 1,905 2,930 2,930 2,184 1,620 
R-sq 0.448 0.447 0.482 0.473 0.404 0.384 0.411 0.415 
Notes: CBD refers to C8 in Tokyo and C3 in Osaka. The constant term coefficients are not reported. Standard errors (clustered at the municipality 
level) in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Event-study results for population growth. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Tokyo MA Osaka MA 
 ln(residential population) ln(residential population) 
C3 * yr 1985–89 -0.083  -0.085 -0.083 -0.029  -0.039 -0.035 
 (0.008)  (0.003) (0.009) (0.011)  (0.008) (0.011) 
C3 * yr 1990–94 -0.184  -0.185 -0.177 -0.096  -0.114 -0.094 
 (0.012)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.011) 
C3 * yr 1995–99 -0.144  -0.156 -0.136 -0.091  -0.126 -0.081 
 (0.011)  (0.013) (0.012) (0.006)  (0.012) (0.008) 
C3 * yr 2000–03 -0.002  -0.015 -0.008 -0.007  -0.051 0.002 
 (0.005)  (0.017) (0.006) (0.012)  (0.015) (0.013) 
(C8-C3) * yr 1985–89 -0.033  -0.028 -0.032     
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.007)     
(C8-C3) * yr 1990–94 -0.088  -0.082 -0.081     
 (0.009)  (0.007) (0.010)     
(C8-C3) * yr 1995–99 -0.079  -0.075 -0.071     
 (0.008)  (0.009) (0.008)     
(C8-C3) * yr 2000–03 -0.007  -0.006 -0.013     
 (0.008)  (0.011) (0.009)     
(CC-CBD) * yr 1985–89 -0.019  -0.017 -0.019 -0.000  -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) 
(CC-CBD) * yr 1990–94 -0.049  -0.048 -0.041 -0.003  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.010)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
(CC-CBD) * yr 1995–99 -0.033  -0.033 -0.025 0.002  0.002 0.012 
 (0.007)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.008) 
(CC-CBD) * yr 2000–03 0.014  0.014 0.008 0.023  0.022 0.032 
 (0.003)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.006) 
ln(dist.) * yr 1985–89  0.013    -0.001   
  (0.003)    (0.002)   
ln(dist.) * yr 1990–94  0.037    0.006   
  (0.005)    (0.004)   
ln(dist.) * yr 1995–99  0.031    0.007   
  (0.004)    (0.003)   
ln(dist.) * yr 2000–03  -0.003    -0.002   
  (0.002)    (0.002)   
Municipality-specific linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Two-way FEs X X X X X X X X 
Controls   X    X  
Subsample (<30km)    X    X 
Obs. 3,860 3,860 2,895 1,905 2,930 2,930 2,184 1,620 
R-sq 0.939 0.936 0.946 0.929 0.908 0.903 0.920 0.858 
Notes: CBD refers to C8 in Tokyo and C3 in Osaka. The constant term coefficients are not reported. Standard errors (clustered at the municipality 
level) in parentheses.
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Table 5: Housing stock in the cities of Tokyo and Osaka. 
   Condominium (# stories)   
Year Housing stock Detached house 1–5 6–10 11–14 15+ Tenement house Others 
Panel A: the city of Tokyo 
1998 3,468.8 925.1 1,718 714.6 75 36 
2003 3,842.4 996.6 1,747.6 565 368.7 73.3 68.1 23.2 
2008 4,177.7 1,012.2 1,807.9 672.7 468 134 61.6 21.2 
2013 4,601.6 1,060.7 1,880.9 800.8 556 203.2 75.8 24.1 
Δ1998–2013 1,132.8 135.6 162.9 845.4 
(118%) 
0.8 -11.9 
(%) (33%) (15%) (9%) (1%) (-33%) 
Panel B: the city of Osaka 
1998 1,102.7 233.7 336.9 392.1 132.1 7.9 
2003 1,186.9 298.9 314.1 259.6 172.1 49.1 88.4 4.6 
2008 1,262.1 303.6 294.3 301.2 201.3 87.5 70.4 3.8 
2013 1,343.2 334.1 283.3 331.4 234.4 112.8 43.7 3.4 
Δ1998–2013 240.5 100.4 -53.6 286.5 
(73%) 
-88.4 -4.5 
(%) (22%) (43%) (-16%) (-67%) (-57%)   
Notes: Data on the number of dwelling units (in thousand) classified by building structure are only available at the major city level (data sources: the 
Housing and Land Survey of Japan, various years). The data in areas denoted gray refer to the total number of condominium units in the buildings of 
"6–10 stories," "11–14 stories," and "15 stories or more," because separate data are not available. "Condominium" here also includes the small-sized 
single-bedroom apartments. 
Table 6: The locations of high-rise buildings in Tokyo prefecture. 
  Number of buildings Proportion 
  # stories # stories 
Year Area 9–12 13–29 30+ 9–12 13–29 30+ 
1980 central 3 2,095 176 40% 26% 
 central 8 3,476 359 66% 53% 
 the city of Tokyo 4,966 666 95% 99% 
 Tokyo prefecture 5,236 672 100% 100% 
1990 central 3 3,793 287 12 36% 23% 38% 
 central 8 6,464 599 26 62% 49% 81% 
 the city of Tokyo 9,925 1,174 32 94% 96% 100% 
 Tokyo prefecture 10,506 1,223 32 100% 100% 100% 
2000 central 3 4,854 489 34 31% 19% 39% 
 central 8 8,967 1,131 66 57% 45% 75% 
 the city of Tokyo 14,578 2,263 86 92% 90% 98% 
 Tokyo prefecture 15,811 2,517 88 100% 100% 100% 
2010 central 3 6,023 1,090 134 28% 21% 50% 
 central 8 11,587 2,451 207 55% 48% 78% 
 the city of Tokyo 19,315 4,640 260 91% 91% 97% 
 Tokyo prefecture 21,157 5,121 267 100% 100% 100% 
(Δ1980-2010) central 3 187% 595%   
relative to 1980 central 8 233% 640%   
 the city of Tokyo 289% 636%   
 Tokyo prefecture 304% 702%   
Notes: The reported data refer to the number of all high-rise buildings in Tokyo prefecture, including both the residential buildings and buildings for 
other purposes (data sources: the Tokyo Prefectural Statistical Yearbook, various years). Related data for other prefectures in our sample are not 
available. The data in areas denoted gray refer to the total number of buildings with "13–29 stories" and "30 stories or more," because separate data 
are not available. 
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Table 7: The types of super high-rise buildings in Tokyo prefecture. 
Completion time of the building 
Number of super high-rise buildings (2015)  





office, and others 
 
Residential / All 
purposes 
1980–84 45 4 0 41 9% 
1985–89 55 10 14 31 18% 
1990–94 140 20 34 86 14% 
1995–99 118 20 36 62 17% 
2000–04 213 75 49 89 35% 
2005–09 273 108 68 97 40% 
2010–14 174 48 53 73 28% 
Notes: The data shown in the table refer to the number of super high-rise buildings (over 60 meters in height) in 2015 (data sources: the Annual 
Report of Architectural Statistics 2016, which was released by the Tokyo Metropolitan Urban Development Bureau). 
Table 8: Examining the changes in housing structure. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Tokyo MA Osaka MA 
 
"built-to-sell" / 




all housing starts 
"built-to-sell" / 
"built-to-sell&rent" 
C3 * yr 1985–89 -0.267 -0.261 -0.231 -0.191 
 (0.038) (0.054) (0.049) (0.058) 
C3 * yr 1990–94 -0.279 -0.306 -0.158 -0.084 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.090) (0.107) 
C3 * yr 1995–99 0.041 -0.033 0.164 0.199 
 (0.162) (0.168) (0.121) (0.140) 
C3 * yr 2000–03 0.148 0.081 0.218 0.212 
 (0.189) (0.175) (0.140) (0.157) 
(C8-C3) * yr 1985–89 -0.218 -0.188   
 (0.026) (0.038)   
(C8-C3) * yr 1990–94 -0.232 -0.208   
 (0.026) (0.046)   
(C8-C3) * yr 1995–99 -0.140 -0.193   
 (0.055) (0.098)   
(C8-C3) * yr 2000–03 -0.142 -0.217   
 (0.078) (0.129)   
(CC-CBD) * yr 1985–89 -0.136 -0.113 -0.106 -0.081 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.040) 
(CC-CBD) * yr 1990–94 -0.137 -0.111 -0.157 -0.085 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.056) (0.070) 
(CC-CBD) * yr 1995–99 -0.038 -0.042 0.003 0.071 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.075) (0.094) 
(CC-CBD) * yr 2000–03 -0.015 -0.039 0.083 0.141 
 (0.053) (0.058) (0.087) (0.107) 
Municipality-specific linear trends X X X X 
Two-way FEs X X X X 
Obs. 3,860 3,860 2,930 2,930 
R-sq 0.501 0.540 0.404 0.378 
Notes: CBD refers to C8 in Tokyo and C3 in Osaka. Constant term coefficients are not reported. Standard errors (clustered at the municipality level) 
in parentheses.
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Table A1: Summary statistics. 
 Tokyo MA Osaka MA 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: cross-sectional data           
housing starts (sq.m) p.c. (mean 86–95) 163 1.15 0.28 0.65 3.02 122 0.96 0.32 0.50 3.55 
housing starts (sq.m) p.c. (mean 96–03) 163 1.02 0.37 0.57 3.59 122 0.94 0.33 0.51 2.62 
population growth rate (%) (mean 86–95) 163 0.75 1.20 -3.11 6.54 122 0.12 1.24 -2.83 8.87 
population growth rate (%) (mean 96–03) 163 0.48 0.65 -1.00 3.17 122 0.11 0.71 -1.56 2.40 
population growth rate (%) (mean 96–15) 47 0.83 0.62 -0.15 3.37 55 0.24 0.79 -0.90 2.81 
com. land price change (%) (mean 93–95) 163 -14.25 5.71 -31.73 -1.80 122 -13.19 7.13 -28.33 3.40 
NDPR (mean 90&95) 47 1.00 0.35 0.04 1.52 56 1.01 0.27 0.09 1.37 
population per sq.km 95 (in thousand) 163 6.11 4.44 0.22 18.83 122 5.36 4.72 0.12 17.95 
distance from the Tokyo/Osaka station (km) 163 33.02 18.57 1.00 99.79 122 33.23 27.81 1.00 113.30 
Panel B: panel data (1980–2003)           
population (in thousand) 3,860 176.44 142.27 22.79 799.76 2,930 136.18 118.08 22.93 810.48 
housing starts (sq.m) p.c. 3,860 1.07 0.42 0.25 8.71 2,930 0.95 0.48 0.25 6.00 
"built-to-sell" (relative to all housing starts) 3,860 0.29 0.17 0 0.90 2,930 0.30 0.18 0 0.89 
"built-to-sell" (relative to "built-to-sell&rent") 3,860 0.53 0.22 0 1.00 2,930 0.54 0.24 0 1.00     
Notes: NDPR: the nighttime population to the daytime population ratio. "built-to-sell" (relative to all housing starts): the ratio of "built-to-sell" dwellings 
in total housing starts (in sq.m). "built-to-sell" (relative to "built-to-sell&rent"): the proportion of "built-to-sell" dwellings to total "built-to-sell" and "built-
to-rent" dwellings. Data on residential population are obtained from the Residential Population Survey conducted by the Local Administration Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Data on daytime population are obtained from the Tokyo Prefectural Statistical Yearbook and the 
Osaka Prefectural Statistical Yearbook (various years; reported in a five-year frequency). Data on housing starts are obtained from the Annual Report 
of Architectural Statistics, which is released by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (Department of Information Management, 
Policy Bureau); data for 2007 are missing. A municipality's distance from the core of the central city (Tokyo station and Osaka station for the Tokyo 
and Osaka MAs, respectively) is based on the longitude-latitude distance measure. 
Table A2: Considering the Hanshin earthquake that occurred in the Osaka MA in 1995. 
 (1) (2) 
 Osaka MA (excl. Hyogo prefecture) 
 
ln(housing starts per capita)  
(mean 1996–2003) 
residential population growth rate (%) 
(mean 1996–2003) 
Commercial land price change (%) -0.006 -0.022 
(mean 1993–1995) (0.003) (0.011) 
ln(distance from city center) -0.047 -0.165 
 (0.029) (0.121) 
ln(population per sq.km 1995) -0.005 -0.047 
 (0.025) (0.101) 
ln(housing starts p.c.)  0.448  
(mean 1986–1995) (0.148)  
population growth rate (%)  0.258 
(mean 1986–1995)  (0.094) 
Obs. 94 94 
R-sq 0.332 0.161 
Notes: The constant term coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The data of Hyogo prefecture (damaged by the 







(a) The major MAs                                   (b) Tokyo MA                              (c) Osaka MA 
Figure 1: The hierarchical structure of the Tokyo and Osaka MAs. 
Notes: (a): The location of the Tokyo and Osaka MAs. (b): The zoomed view of the Tokyo MA. The black area indicates the three central wards of 
Tokyo city, the area marked red (plus the three central wards) indicates the eight central wards, and the area marked green (plus the eight central 
wards) indicates the city of Tokyo (622 sq.km). (c): The zoomed map of the Osaka MA. The area marked red indicates the three central wards of 
Osaka city, and the green area (plus the three central wards) indicates the city of Osaka (223 sq.km). The red, blue, black, and gray lines in (b) and 
(c) are prefectural boundaries, coastal lines, municipality-level city/town/village boundaries and municipality-level ward boundaries, respectively. 
 
Figure 2: Land price fluctuations in the major cities of Japan. 
Notes: Data for the six largest cities are obtained from the Japan Statistics Yearbook (various years). Data for the city of Tokyo are obtained from 
Shimizu and Nishimura (2007), which are only available in 1980–1998. 
 
Figure 3: The scale of housing starts. 
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Figure 4: The intensity of housing starts in central urban areas. 
Notes: See data sources in Table A1 (data for 2007 are missing). 
 
Figure 5: The number of house tenures. 
Notes: Data sources: Hirayama (2005); the raw data are reported in the Housing Survey of Japan (1978, 1993) and the Housing and Land Survey of  
Japan (1998). 
Figure 6: Land price changes against the distance from city center. 
Notes: Central Tokyo (Osaka) refers to the Tokyo (Osaka) station for Tokyo (Osaka) MA. "com.-res." denotes a municipality's commercial land price 
change (mean 1993–1995) minus the related residential land price change (mean 1993–1995). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Figure 7: NDPR against the commercial land price changes. 
Notes: See data sources in Table A1. Data are only available for the urban municipalities in Tokyo and Osaka prefectures. 
 
Figure 8: Residential population growth in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs. 
Notes: See data sources in Table A1. 
 
Figure 9: Daytime population growth in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs. 
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Figure 10: Housing starts against lagged population growth. 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Figure 11: Changes in population size against lagged housing starts. 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Figure 12: Housing starts against residential land price changes. 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Figure 13: Event-study treatment effects for the real estate bubble boom and burst. 
Notes: Sample includes all urban municipalities in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs from 1980–2003; all specifications include municipality fixed effects, 
year fixed effects and municipality-specific linear time trends. The top-left (top-right) panel shows the effects on the scale of housing starts across all 
urban municipalities in the Tokyo (Osaka) MA (Equation (4)); the panels at the bottom show the effects on ln(population). The vertical lines in each 
panel show the estimated 95 percent confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered on municipalities. 
Figure 14: Event-study treatment effects by period. 
Notes: Sample includes all urban municipalities in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs from 1980–2003; all specifications include municipality fixed effects, 
year fixed effects and municipality-specific linear time trends; estimated coefficients and standard errors are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The top-left 
(top-right) panel shows the effects on the scale of housing starts across all urban municipalities in Tokyo (Osaka) MA (Equation (5)); the panels at the 
bottom show the effects on ln(population). The vertical lines in each panel show the estimated 95 percent confidence intervals, based on standard 
errors clustered on municipalities.
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Figure 15: Employment growth. 
Notes: Data are reported in a five-year frequency (1981–2016; data sources: the National Population Census of Japan conducted by the Statistics 
Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications).  
 
Figure 16: The average house size in the new housing supply. 
Notes: The reported data refer to the municipality mean by year. See data sources in Table A1. 
 
Figure 17: Changes in the types of housing starts and cross-prefecture variation. 
Notes: The data reported in the right panel (the y-axis) refer to the change of sell_ratio (the proportion of "built-to-sell" dwellings to total "built-to-sell" 
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Figure A1: Population density against the distance from city center. 
Notes: Central Tokyo (Osaka) refers to the Tokyo (Osaka) station for the Tokyo (Osaka) MA. See data sources in Table A1. 
 
Figure A2: Number of housing starts in the major MAs and other regions. 
Notes: See data sources in Table A1. 
 
Figure A3: Land price changes in the major MAs and other regions. 
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Figure A4: The heterogeneous impacts of demand shocks and supply shocks on land prices.  
Notes: (a) As the demand of residential land (or, housing) increases (from D0 to D1), the equilibrium land price (P) increases. (b) As the supply of 
residential land (or, housing) increases (from S0 to S1), the equilibrium land price decreases. 
 
Figure A5: The scale of housing starts by house type. 
Notes: See data sources in Table A1. Data for 2007 are missing. 
 
Figure A6: The average floor area of the three house types. 
Notes: See data sources in Table A1. 
